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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the first widespread uses of computer databases in the 1970s,
experts have warned of the Orwellian "computer state" in which
governments and private corporations collect, store, and share vast
troves of data about citizens. 1 In the last decade or so, new technologies
have been brought to bear upon the information management challenge
posed by this deluge of data. These new techniques have targeted three
distinct, but related, areas. First, they have enabled the cataloging of
human behaviors that were previously ephemeral. These enhanced
cataloging powers have coincided with an increasing willingness by law
enforcement agencies to conduct-and courts to condone-widespread,
total surveillance of citizens in the name of national security. Second,
semantic query systems and "big data" analytical engines have
introduced an approach to discerning patterns in data that prior systems
lacked. The methodology underlying these approaches is tacit, but, I
will argue, likely flawed. Third, these new techniques of surveillance
gathering and data analysis have begun to transition into their next
phase, prediction and scoring of individuals' risk of criminal behavior.
Individualized suspicion of criminal activity once triggered a review of
a person's data portfolio, but now the data portfolio triggers
individualized suspicion.
While predictive techniques have been used in targeted areas of
criminology for decades, this article argues that the move toward
predictive policing using automated surveillance, semantic processing,
and analytics tools magnifies each technology's harms to privacy and
due process, while further obfuscating the systems' technological and
methodological limitations. Furthermore, they do so with little
offsetting diminishment of the risk of criminal activity or terrorism. The
time is right to revisit predictive systems in light of these new
advancements.
Legal protections for individual privacy are at a low ebb in the
United States, as countless commentators and the recent release of longsecret FISA court opinions have demonstrated. A long string of cases
interpreting the First and Fourth Amendments have shown that those
legal doctrines are mostly inadequate to meet the challenges posed by
the use of modem, technologically amplified surveillance and prediction
techniques. My purpose here is to consider the legal, technical, and
methodological issues raised by surveillance-fed predictive systems that
may substantiate policy arguments against their widespread adoption. If
this policy position is convincing, then legal and economic arguments
1. See

WILLIAM BOGARD, THE SIMULATION OF SURVEILLANCE: HYPERCONTROL IN

TELEMATIC SOCIETIES

2 (1996).
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could be brought to bear to discourage the conditions which have
fostered the explosive growth and abuse of these systems.
With those objectives in mind, the paper proceeds in four parts. Part
II describes the paradigm of the "triple threat" to privacy which stems
from total surveillance, big data analytics, and actuarial trends in
policing. Part III surveys methodological problems with big data
analytics and predictive policing which make these tools much less
useful than advertised. Part IV considers the difficulties of using
traditional First and Fourth Amendment doctrine in the light of
technological advances. Finally, Part V discusses the possible methods
of curbing the use of these flawed tools in the pre-crime prediction
arena by exploring various expanded legal and economic approaches.
II. THE PARADIGM OF CRIME PREDICTION
A. Brief Overview of Modern, Total Surveillance
To best comprehend the full range of privacy concerns stemming
from the use of predictive systems built on big data surveillance, it is
critical to assess the technical and legal environment in which these
systems are built and used. Recent disclosures by Edward Snowden
about the data gathering practices of the National Security Agency
(NSA) and other law enforcement agencies have been instructive in this
2
by
regard. The picture that emerges from these disclosures and others
prior whistleblowers such as Mark Kline and William Binney, 3 coupled
with the cavalier attitude of current and former NSA directors 4 and
charges by security experts that the NSA has for several years attempted
to introduce subtle flaws into cryptographic encryption standards in
order to make communications easier to analyze, 5 is a grim wake-up
call to Americans and foreign citizens about how little privacy they
possess.
The U.S. Government's ability to compromise the world's
2. The stories and commentary on the Snowden disclosures are too numerous to list
individually, but the Guardian newspaper maintains a good launch point. See, e.g., The NSA
Files, GUARDIAN, Dec. 16, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files.
3.

See JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY 188-91 (2008); James Bamford, The

NSA is Building the Country's Biggest Spy Center, WIRED, Mar. 15, 2012, http://www.wired.
com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/.
4. See Yochai Benkler, Fact: The NSA Gets Negligible Intelfrom Americans' Metadata,
GUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/08/nsa-bulkmetadata-surveillance-intelligence.
5. Kim Zetter, How a Crypto 'Backdoor' Pitted the Tech World Against the NSA,
WIRED, Sept. 24, 2013, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-backdoor/.
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communications systems begins at the physical wire. Because a large
portion of internet traffic is routed through the United States on the way
to its final destination, total surveillance begins by tapping into key
positions at the junction points where international undersea cables
attach to U.S. networks. 6 However, these cables-docking in many
places on both coastlines, including New Jersey, Miami, and San
Francisco-are controlled by private telecom carriers, so their
assistance is required. 7 At these junction points, in secret rooms full of
NSA equipment, the optical signal carried by fiber optic cable is split
and mirrored by sophisticated technology. One signal is sent on its way
normally through the network, while the mirrored copy is redirected to
NSA storage and recording equipment. 9 AT&T, among others, has a
history of colluding with the federal intelligence agencies going back
decades.' 0 In fact, some have suggested that one reason for the
government's easing of the 1980s AT&T "breakup" consent decree,
allowing the company to reestablish itself with much the same
dominance as it had before the breakup, was to simplify NSA collusion
by reducing the number of private telecom entities." Most of this
wiretapping assistance by private telecom companies was, in fact,
illegal under federal and state laws until the FISA Amendments Act of
2008 bequeathed to them blanket and retroactive immunity from
prosecution. 12
Despite this elaborate setup, listening in on a raw data stream still
has its difficulties. Network communication is broken up into discrete13
packets of data which, when jumbled together, make little sense.
Intelligence agencies cannot simply read a person's email off the wire
without additional processing. 14 Reassembling all these discrete packets
into a sensible narrative takes time, complex software, and a great deal
of processing power. 15 To further complicate matters, some data traffic
between consumers and companies is encrypted to make it unreadable
to anyone merely listening in on the data stream. 16
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See BAMFORD, supra note 3, at 175-79.
See id. at 175-81.
Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 188-91.
See id. at 223-30.
TIM Wu, THE MASTER SWITCH 250 (2010).

12.

FISA Amendments Act of 2008, P.L. 110-261 (July 10, 2008).

13. See BAMFORD, supra note 3, at 191-94.
14. See id.
15. See id. at 194.
16. Google mail, for example, encrypts communication between the user and the service,
and Google has recently stepped up efforts to encrypt communications between company data
centers. See Craig Timberg, Google Encrypts DataAmid Backlash Against NSA Spying, WASH.
POST (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/google-encrypts-
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In processing, the data is first culled by intelligent hardware
solutions that clean the packets by filtering out unnecessary routing
information, then attempt to reassemble them into a more sensible order
based on rough targeting and selection parameters. 17 Once culled, the
data is typically directed to NSA facilities, where it is stored until it
becomes useful to analysts. 18 A recent executive order gave the NSA
authority to store any and all traffic for up to five years.' 9 Naturally,
storing all the internet's traffic in raw form for that long requires a
massive storage facility, and to keep up with the explosive data growth,
a secret, new, $2 billion facility is being constructed in Utah. °
Flowing through its servers and routers and stored in nearbottomless databases will be all forms of communication,
including the complete contents of private emails, cell phone
calls, and Google searches, as well as all sorts of personal data
trails-parking receipts, travel21itineraries, bookstore purchases, and
other digital "pocket litter."
Encrypted data, considered to be reason for suspicion in and of itself,
deciphered even years later,
may be stored indefinitely so that it can
2 2 be
improves.
technology
as codebreaking
Given the technical and resource challenges, it would be far easier
simply to secure the collusion of major internet service and content
providers than to dissect and reassemble the packets one by one or to
crack their encryption. In this way, information could be reviewed in the
context of its creation. In fact, as the Snowden documents have
revealed, this is precisely what the NSA has done, bringing legal
pressure on dozens of major ISPs to assent to "information sharing"
programs allowing direct or simplified NSA access to user data in its
original context.23
data-amid-backlash-against-nsa-spying/2013/09/06/9acc3c20-1722-11 e3-a2ec-b47e45e6f8efst

ory.html.
17. See BAMFORD, supra note 3, at 192-94.
18. See generally id.
19. Glenn Greenwald & James Bald, The Top Secret Rules that Allow NSA to Use US
Data Without a Warrant, GUARDIAN, June 20, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/

2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant; see Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981),
available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html.
20. BAMFORD, supra note 3, at 188-91.
21. Id.
22. Joshua Kroll, Is the NSA Keeping Your Encrypted Traffic Forever?, FREEDOM TO

(Sept. 13, 2013), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/kroll/is-the-nsa-keeping-yourencrypted-traffic-forever/.
TINKER

23. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Datafrom
Nine US. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 6, 2013),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-firm-nine-us-inter
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With the opening of the new storage facility in Utah and the
cooperation of important ISPs, the agency's technical capabilities will
be consistent with the recently publicized agenda of its leaders: total
collection and total storage, with analysis to follow. According to a
recent profile of General Keith Alexander, director of the NSA,
[He] wants as much data as he can get. And he wants to hang on
to it for as long as he can .... [H]e thinks he needs to be able to

see entire networks of communications and also go "back in
time," as he has said publicly, to study how terrorists and their
networks evolve. To find the needle in the haystack, he needs the
entire haystack.24
A former colleague has said, "Alexander's strategy is the same as
Google's: I need to get all of the data." 25 These policies have met with
little judicial resistance: the court charged with review of surveillance
practices, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), has
recently released a formerly secret court opinion sanctifying the
widespread telephony metadata gathering program under Section 215 of
the Patriot Act and the "third-party doctrine" interpretation of Smith v.
Maryland.26 Even after the outcry over the Snowden revelations, the
FISC recertified the program. 2 7 The Senate Intelligence Committee also
recently praised the NSA program and voted a bill out of committee
which, if passed, would codify into law most of the current NSA
net-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3aOcOda8-cebf- 11 e2-8845-d970ccb04497
_story.html. Though, occasionally the ISPs have denied colluding with the NSA. See, e.g., id.;
Jon Brodkin, AT&T Gives DEA 26 Years of Phone Call Records to Wage War on Drugs,
ARSTECHNICA (Sept. 3, 2013, 12:11 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/att-gives-

dea-26-years-of-phone-call-records-to-wage-war-on-drugs/.

One smaller provider of encrypted

email service has resisted the NSA. Joe Mullin, Lavabit's Appeal: We're Actually Not Required
to Wiretap Our Own Users, (Oct. 11, 2013, 2:25 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/
I 0/lavabits-appeal-were-actually-not-required-to-wiretap-our-own-users/.
24. Shane Harris, The Cowboy of the NSA, FOREIGN POLICY (Sept. 9, 2013), available at

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboyof
25. Id.

the nsa keithalexander.

26. Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the
Production of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No: BR 13-109, available at http://www.

uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/brl3-09-primary-order.pdf (last accessed Dec. 16, 2013); see
also Jake Laperruque, Intelligence Agencies Justify Collecting Your PersonalData by Applying
the Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 20,
2013), available at https://www.cdt.org/blogs/nasreen-hosein/2011 intelligence-agencies-justify-

collecting-your-personal-data-applying-six-de.
27. Press Release, OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT'L INTELLIGENCE, Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Court Approves Government's Application to Renew Telephony Metadata
Program (Oct. 11, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/pressreleases/1 91 -press-releases-2013/944-foreign-intell igence-surveillance-court-approves-govemm
ent%E2%80%99s-application-to-renew-telephony-metadata-program.
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policies on telephone metadata collection.28
Most of what has been discussed so far pertains to data
surveillance-gathering transactions and other traces of human behavior
that have already occurred. Biometric surveillance additionally ensures
that watchers can always know who, and where, individuals are.2 9 The
widespread placement of video surveillance cameras, when linked with
centralized facial image databases and facial recognition software,
enables the identification of citizens in virtually any public or semiprivate space. 30 New forms of digital identification, including passports
and state driving licenses containing RFID chips, but also including
"cardless" ID systems based on fingerprints, retinal scans, and voice
patterns, ensure that all interactions with an individual are authenticated
(and non-anonymous). 3 1 Automobile tracking devices such as the EZPass toll system enable organizations to identify automobiles as they
move through diverse checkpoints. 32 Tracking of cell phone data with
"tower dumps," combined with statistical modeling of human
movements, 33 can ensure that an individual's location is always known.
Moreover, the unification of these diverse data sources is already under
way. For example, the FBI's Next Generation Identification (NGI)
program seeks to unify civilian, law enforcement, and military
biometric databases with photographs and other data held by private
institutions (e.g., Facebook) into a centralized repository accessible to
all governmental agencies. 4 This powerful combination, unifying data
surveillance with centralized, mandatory biometric identity tracking,
enables what Margaret Hu calls "bureaucratized surveillance," 35 in
are screened, automated,
which all encounters between state and citizen
36
suspicious.
be
to
deemed
when
flagged
and
In addition to government surveillance, commercial entities use
28. See Matt Sledge, Senate Intelligence Committee Passes Bill that Codifies, Expands
NSA Powers, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 31, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/10/3 I/senate-bill-nsa n_4183183.html.
29. See Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1475-81
(2013).

30.

at 1534-35.
See id.

31.
32.

Seeid.at 1480-81.
See Kashmir Hill, E-Z Passes Get Read All Over New York (Not Just at Toll Booths),

FORBES (Sept. 12, 2013, 4:44 PM), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/
09/12/e-zpasses-get-read-alI-over-new-york-not-just-at-toll-booths/.

33.

See Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of

Human Mobility, 3 Sci. REP. 1376 (2013), available at http://www.nature.com/srep/2013/

130325/srep01376/full/srep01376.html; see also David Kravets, 1.3M Cellphone Snopping
Requests Yearly? It's Time for Privacy and Transparency Laws, WIRED (July 7, 2012, 6:30

AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/07/mobile-data-transparency/all/.
34. See Hu, supra note 29, at 1552-53.
35.

Id.at 1479.

36.

Id.at 1500.

JOURNAL TECHNOLOGYOFLA WAND POLICY

[Vol. 19

extensive tracking networks to collect and sell the behaviors of
consumers, even going so far as to collect how long it takes to read an
Amazon Kindle book.37 Even children are not immune from
surveillance. The Glendale, California school district has hired a private
company, Geo Listening, to review its 13,000 students' social media
38
activity and produce a daily report on problematic online conduct.
However, some school districts are becoming concerned about the vast
explosion of data now being collected on children and shared with
private entities. 39 Recent amendments to FERPA expanded the circle of
parties with which student data can be shared. Not only are the
companies providing learning data systems often not clear about with
whom they share data, parents are concerned about what will eventually
come of behavioral data and other assessments-and
41 whether that
information will permanently limit their child's future.
B. The Rise of Big DataAnalytics
As we have seen, the NSA now has a massive collection of internet
and telephone traffic, stored for up to five years. Internet content
providers share with the NSA the contents of private databases and
encrypted communications with customers. Private data brokers track
every conceivable citizen encounter, then digest, codify, and sell those
data collections to whoever will buy them. Biometric and location data
is unified in centralized repositories. Data is everywhere, but what can
be done to turn this morass of data into useful, actionable information?
This question had a hesitant answer until the advent of the statistical
modeling, data processing,'42and artificial learning techniques collectively
called "big data analytics.
Originally created to understand consumer behavior-will a person
who buys product X also buy product Y?-big data analytics has
increasingly come to be seen as the solution to any problem involving
37. See, e.g., Privacy and Consumer Profiling, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION
CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/profiling/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2013); Alexandra Alter, Your EBook is Reading You, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBI
0001424052702304870304577490950051438304.
38. Tim Cushing, CA School DistrictAnnounces It's Doing Round-The-Clock Monitoring
of Its 13,000 Students' Social Media Activities, TECHDIRT (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.tech
dirt.com/articles/20130902/13154624384/ca-school-district-announces-its-doing-round-the-cloc
k-monitoring-its- 13000-students-social-media-activities.shtml.
39. Natasha Singer, Deciding Who Sees Students' Data, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/deciding-who-sees-students-data.html.

40.
41.

Id.
Id.

42.

See Special

Report, Data, Data Everywhere, ECONOMIST

http://www.economist.com/node/15557443.

(Feb. 25,

2010),
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voters
large amounts of data, including determining how to influence
in casinos. 4
diagnosing medical conditions, and looking for cheaters
Big data analytics has been seen as a panacea for data-heavy problems
because it shortcuts the time-consuming process of forming a
hypothesis, gathering data, and testing it-the classical method in all
sciences.44 It improves efficiency by using computation to examine
large data sets for correlations between data entities, eschewing the
deeper understanding given by theories with the power of causal
explanation.45 Chris Anderson has called this trend "the end of theory,"
as theory is irrelevant to the analytical framework-no theory is needed
by the machine to initiate the relational analysis, and no theory of
explanation results from it.46 One commentator sums it up by saying,
"The key is to forget about the truth. .... Truth is not a make or break

test."47 This shotgun approach to finding correlations has been enabled
by cheap data storage, cheap computing power, and the ever-increasing
availability of feeder data48 enabled by near-total government and

private surveillance of humans' every7 action. In the words of one
advocate, "More data is always better."
Correlations are interesting and useful for categories of inquiry that
can do without causal explanation. An oft-cited example is how Google
can see influenza infection trends before the CDC by correlating search
terms about flu remedies with geolocation data; however, it turns out
that this "successful" example of data mining was exaggerated by a
factor of two, according to a study in Nature.50 In light of this, the areas
where these methods are useful tend to be those where high rates of
spurious correlation and false positives are acceptable, or where the
model has low predictive power but is still better than existing methods
by a few percent. 51 Big data began in marketing because that field's
tolerance for error is so high. The president of blog data miner
43.
44.

See generally STEPHEN BAKER, THE NUMERATI 12-15 (2008).
Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method

Obsolete, WIRED (June 23, 2008), http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/magazine/1607/pbtheory.

45.
46.

Id.
Id.

47. BAKER, supra note 43, at 90.
48. See VIKTOR MAYER SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 54-56 (Kindle ed. 2013).

49.

BAKER, supra note 43, at 128 (quoting NSA's chief mathematician James Schatz).

50.

Nick Bilton, Disruptions: Data Without Context Tells a Misleading Story, N.Y.

TIMES (Feb. 24, 2013), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/disruptions-google-flu-trendsshows-problems-of-big-data-without-context/.

51. See BAKER, supra note 43, at 89-90. During the Obama 2008 Presidential campaign,
for example, big data was used to identify 75% of swing voters on three key issues, enabling the
more efficient spending of vast amounts of advertising money. Id.at 89-90.
52. Id.at 116.
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Umbria, Howard Kaushansky, says "We're providing qualitative
research, not quantitative.... It's directional. It gives early indications
of where things are going.
However, it remains to be seen whether
certain problems of law and policy, such as how to predict the bad acts
of potential lawbreakers before they happen, can be solved by methods
which communicate no theory of causal understanding.
C. Predictive Systems and the Dream of Total Knowledge
Prediction in criminal justice is an old idea, used for decades in
various contexts such as parole risk assessments, phrenology, and
sentencing. 54 At the outset, it is useful to distinguish between actuarial
and clinical methods of prediction. Clinical methods of prediction "rely
on subjective expert opinion," such as expert ps),chiatric testimony, to
assess individuals for criminal characteristics. On the other hand,
actuarial methods in criminal law seek to establish "statistical
correlations between group traits and group criminal offending rates. 56
Actuarial techniques in criminology have been around at least since the
1930s, when they were first used in parole prediction, and have been
cyclically in and out of vogue ever since.57 Since 9/11, however, the
actuarial approach has been turbocharged, both by an infusion of data
resulting from the digitization and monitoring of everything, and by an
infusion of method with big data analytical tools. 8 Naturally, law
enforcement agencies are charging ahead to find ways to incorporate
big data into crime prediction.
Predictive systems built on big data mark a turn from individualized
analysis to event-based analysis. 59 In individualized analysis,
surveillance data is used to provide evidence against someone already
under suspicion. For example, the total transparency of banking
records allows the police to see the large cash withdrawal, helping to
corroborate other evidence. Event-based analysis focuses on identifying
patterns by correlating data with negative events (like prior terrorist
attacks), then seeks to app~ly those correlations in reverse, predictively,
to individuals or groups. 6 Such a system, for example, might correlate
certain words in Facebook posts with potential school shootings,
allowing police to scrutinize or arrest a list of individuals who fit a
53.

Id. at 114.

54.
55.
56.

See generally BERNARD E. HARcOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION 47-107 (2007).
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.

57. Id. at 39.
58. See BAKER, supra note 43, at 123-53.
59. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY
60.
61.

See id.
Seeid. at 193.

AT RISK

191 (2007).
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threatening pattern. The former method requires the suspect's data to be
accessible to law enforcement with traditional warrants. The latter
method demands vast quantities of "normal" (i.e., non-criminal)
test its statistical
behavioral data against which the analytical engine can
62
deviance.
of
models
develop
to
order
in
calibrations
This trend probably should not surprise us. Sociologists such as
William Bogard have, for decades, forecast the likely outcome of
increased "panoptic" surveillance: prediction. 63 In the classic
panopticon of Bentham and Foucault, not knowing whether you were
being watched has a normalizing influence on behavior. 64 However, as
we have seen, total surveillance has finite limits because the illusion
which drives this normalizing influence begins to break down when so
much data exists that it could not possibly all be scrutinized. Predictive
policing seeks to battle those limits with a new conceptual framework,
"not just [] a technology of surveillance, but [] a kind of surveillance in
advance of surveillance, a technology of 'observation before the
fact.' ' 65 What drives the "technology of surveillance" today is "the
fantasy" of simulation. 66 In Bogard's words:
[t]echnologies of simulation are forms of hypersurveillant
control, where the prefix "hyper" implies not simply an
intensification of surveillance, but the effort to push surveillance
technologies to their absolute limit. That limit is an imaginary
line beyond which control operates, so to speak, in "advance" of
itself and where surveillance--a technology of exposure and
into a technology of pre-exposure and prerecording--evolves
67
recording.

No discussion of predictive systems would be complete without a
passing mention of the book and film Minority Report, wherein "precrime" prediction is so effective that the police feel comfortable in
arresting people for what they are foreseen to do. 68 In that dystopia, the
62.

See BAKER, supra note 43, at 7-9.

63.

See WILLIAM BOGARD, THE SIMULATION OF SURVEILLANCE: HYPERCONTROL IN

TELEMATIC SOCIETIES 3-5 (1996). Bogard uses the word "simulation," by which he means
more than prediction, but prediction is a species of simulation and the terms are equivalent for
the present discussion. See id.
64. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 29-80 (Miran Bo2ovi6 ed.
Verso 1995); see generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979).
65. See BOGARD, supra note 63, at 27 (emphasis removed).
66. Id.at 9.
67. Id. at 4 (emphasis removed).
68. See PHILIP K. DICK, THE MINORITY REPORT (1956); MINORITY REPORT (Twentieth
Cent. Fox 2002).
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prediction relies on clairvoyants, not computers. In ours, surveillancefed predictive systems are now being used in a variety of contexts, both
commercial and governmental. Predictive systems can take a variety of
forms, ranging from individualized predictions based on individual
biometric cues, to profiling based on group attributes gleaned from past
behaviors, to more generalized "high crime area" targeting.
There are simply too many such programs to mention them all, much
less discuss each fully. However, one recent exemplary program is the
expanded TSA pre-flight check system, an expanded version of the
controversial "no-fly" list.69 This unnamed and unannounced program
purports to "prescreen" travelers before they come to the airport by
matching passport and other identity documents with a number of
private and governmental databases, such as those maintained by the
IRS, state law enforcement, airline frequent flyer programs, and credit
risk scoring agencies. 7 Precisely what databases will be searched has
not been divulged. 7 ' The goal of the program is to categorize passengers
by "risk level" to receive higher or lower scrutiny once they arrive at the
airport. 72
Another typical program is the DHS Future Attribute Screening
Technology (FAST) project, which assesses the future crime risk of
individuals by collecting biometric behavioral data such as
cardiovascular signals, pheromones, skin conductivity, eye blink rate,
and respiratory patterns using an array of sensors, video, and audio
recordings.73 The technology was tested publicly in an undisclosed
location in 2011.74 According to the FAST privacy assessment, "The
future time horizon can range from planning an event years in advance
to planning to carry out the act immediately after passing through
screening. The consequences to the actor (perceived as either positive or
negative) can range from none to being temporarily detained to
deportation, prison, or death. 75
69. Susan Stellin, Security Check Now StartsLong Before You Fly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21,
2013, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/22/business/security-check-now-starts-

long-before-you-fly.html.
70. Id.
71.

See id.

72.

Id.("'I think the best way to look at it is as a pre-crime assessment every time you

fly,' said Edward Hasbrouck ...[of] the Identity Project.").
73. See Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST) Project FOIA Request, EPIC,
http://epic.org/privacy/fastproject/; U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT FOR THE FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST) PROJECT 3 (2008),
availableat http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia-st-fast.pdf.
74. Privacy and Consumer Profiling, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER,
http://epic.org/privacy/profiling/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2013).
75. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE FUTURE
ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST) PROJECT 2 (2008), availableat http://www.dhs.gov/
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According to a 2009 PBS story, the NSA is attempting to build
sophisticated artificial intelligence and big-data-driven query systems
capable of answering predictive questions about future world events, or
76
even the future actions of individuals or groups. Incorporating vast
amounts of data from public and private sources, including a database
of the world's newspapers, the system is dubbed AQUAINT, which
7
stands for "Advanced QUestion Answering for INTelligence." A later
system, a so-called "Google for spies" called RIOT, has been built by
intelligence contractor Raytheon for use by national security entities.
RIOT captures social networking data from sites such as Twitter and
Facebook and constructs associational graphs of individuals'
or intelligence analysts to predict future
relationships, then allows crime
79
behaviors.
and
movements
Federal intelligence and security agencies are not the only users of
predictive threat systems. A Memphis police department program begun
in 2006 called Blue CRUSH, built on IBM analytics software, uses
80
statistical modeling of past crime data to identify "hot spots." Police
are then directed to these hot spots to conduct sweeps, make arrests, and
1
display a heightened presence to deter crime. 8 The apparent successes
of the program in reducing crime were heralded by law enforcement and
big data systems-builders alike. 82 However, an internal audit in 2011
determined that 79,000 police memos recording potential crimes had
not been reported, and that further review of these memos would likely
cause the crime rate to go "way up," calling into question many of the
gains of the program. Similar such systems have been installed in

xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacypiast_fast.pdf. A later assessment minimizes these concerns,
stating "FAST is not intended to provide 'probable cause' for law enforcement processes, nor
would the technology replace or pre-empt the decisions of human screeners." Id.
76. James Bamford, The New Thought Police: The NSA Wants to Know How You ThinkMaybe Even What You Think, PBS (Jan. 1, 2009), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/military/nsa-

police.html.
77. Id.
78. Ryan Gallagher, Software that Tracks People on Social Media Created by Defence
Firm, GUARDIAN, Feb. 10, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/10/sofwaretracks-social-media-defence.
79. Id.
80. Memphis Police Department Reduces Crime Rates with IBM Predictive Analytics
Software, IBM, available at http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/32169.wss (last
visited Dec. 17, 2013) [hereinafter Memphis Police DepartmentReduces Crime Rates].
81. See DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, ToP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW
AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 138-44 (2011).
82. See Memphis Police DepartmentReduces Crime Rates, supra note 80.
83. Amos Maki, Crimes Lurk in Memphis Police DepartmentMemos, THE COMMERCIAL
APPEAL (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2012/jan/25/crimes-lurk-in-

police-memos/?partner=RSS.
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numerous cities nationwide, from Los Angeles to Richmond.84
III. TECHNOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE PREDICTIVE PARADIGM

An underlying presumption of predictive systems is that they
function effectively now or will do so in the future. Reason tells us than
an effective predictive system would need to outperform existing
methods of crime prevention according to some valid metric without
introducing side-effects that public policy deems excessively harmful.
Moreover, our cost-benefit driven society would likely stipulate that
these goals be achieved at a lower economic cost than existing methods.
This section will assay the effectiveness of the predictive paradigm in
view of the twin goals of performance and side-effects, focusing
primarily on technological issues. Part IV will then address side-effects,
barriers, and harms of a legal and privacy nature, most of which hinge
on a concept of reasonableness and probability that predictive systems
do not satisfy technologically.
A. Performance:Data Quality, the Base Rate Fallacy,and
Automation Bias
To conceptualize the performance problem, we will first examine
some of the successes and failures of recent predictive systems.
Unfortunately, the successes have been troublingly hard to locate and
quantify. Recently, revelations about NSA eavesdropping programs
have prompted congressional hearings into the effectiveness of the
programs in stopping terrorist activity. Initially, it was claimed by the
Obama Administration that fifty-four terrorist plots had been thwarted
by the NSA's metadata collection program, which is backed by big data
analytics. 85 However, in recent testimony before Congress, NSA
Director Gen. Keith Alexander was pressed by Senator Leahy on that
metric and forced to admit that only one case, wherein a Somalian
immigrant donated money to al-Shabaab, could be directly tied to the
program. 86 Director of National Intelligence James Clapper then
advocated a different metric, than the number of plots foiled, the "peace
84. See Robert L. Mitchell, Predictive Policing Gets Personal, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct.
24, 2013), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9243385/Predictivejpolicinggetsperso
nal.
85. Yochai Benkler, Fact: The NSA Gets Negligible Intel from Americans' Metadata,
GUARDIAN, Oct. 8, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/08/nsa-bulkmetadata-surveillance-intelligence.
86. Id.
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of mind" metric. 87 He explained that, after the Boston Marathon
bombing, agencies were able to use the database to see "whether there
was or was not a subsequent plot involving New York City." 88 Since no
other conspirators were found, and no attack
89 occurred, the program
metric.
new
Clapper's
to
according
succeeded
Looking for results in other predictive systems also reveals few
successes. The Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) program allows
law enforcement, citizens, and others to increase scrutiny on individuals
they deem as suspicious. 90 The individuals are added to a database
called Guardian, triggering additional information collection and
assessment algorithms. As of December 2010, 161,948 SARs were in
the database, of which 103 had been turned into full investigations,
leading to five arrests and no convictions. 92 The Memphis BlueCRUSH
program may owe its apparent early success to thousands of uncounted
incidents. Other critics have contended that predictive policing software
vendor PredPol, which sells risk-terrain modeling tools to police
departments, has little evidence that its programs are effective, and no
way of proving that its "crime reduction"93 statistics are not merely
shifting crime to other, uncounted precincts.
To go along with the lack of specific successes, there have been
several egregious failures to predict and to control abuses. The Boston
bombing case is the most notable recent example, but others are easy to
locate. The widely reviled "no-fly list" incorrectly tags about 1500
airline passengers per week.94 Some notable examples include an airline
pilot who was detained over 80 times in a year, an Army major, two
U.S. senators, and a 4-year-old. 95 Maryland state police used their
87.

Ken Dilanian, NSA Says It ConsideredCollecting Phone Call Location Data, L.A.

90.

See DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW

2
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/nationla-na-nsa-surveillance- 0131003,0,2535
208.story.
88. Id.
89. Id.

AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 144-47 (2011).

91. Id.
92. Id. at 148.
93. See Darwin Bond-Graham & Ali Winston, All Tomorrow's Crimes: The Future of
Policing Looks a Lot Like Good Branding, S.F. WKLY., Oct. 30, 2013, http://www.sfweekly.
com/2013-10-30/news/predpol-sfpd-predictive-policing-compstat-lapd/full/ (citing criminologist
Ed Schmidt, who believes there is little data supporting the effectiveness of predictive policing);
Tim Cushing, 'PredictivePolicing' Company Uses Bad Stats, Contractually-ObligatedShills To
Tout Unproven 'Successes,' TECHDIRT (Nov. 1, 2013), available at http://www.techdirt.com/

articles/20131031/13033125091/predictive-policing-company-uses-bad-stats-contractually-oblig
ated-shills-to-tout-unproven-successes.shtml.
94. Danielle Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1256-57
(2008).
95.

Id. at 1274-75; see also Valerie Hauch, Disabled Woman DeniedEntry to US. After
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access to data available through state-federal "fusion centers" to
infiltrate and watch several political groups, classifying 53 activistsincluding two Catholic nuns-as terrorists. 96 These examples leave
aside the litany of problematic automated decision-making systems used
in administrative contexts such as Colorado's Medicaid and food stamp
benefit program or the "deadbeat parent" locator program, many of
which apply rules 97to individuals using similar techniques to crimeprediction systems.
The reason for such dubious success rates is that predictive system
performance is hindered on many levels, ranging from low quality data
to flawed methodology to poor auditing and supervision. The first and
most obvious barrier to predictive system performance is inaccurate
input data. In part because of the constraints on commercial data
gathering, the data shared through commercial websites is often
"anonymized" in accordance with website policies to satisfy both
consumers and commercial privacy laws. 9 8 Later, the data is deanonymized by commercial aggregators, who have fewer constraints
and an interest in knowing the specific individual. 99 This process is
relatively simple, but often erroneous in details; for example, the
aggregation might know a person's name, but be completely wrong
about his age, race, or shopping habits. This problem is bad enough that
at least one data broker, Acxiom, has recently released a tool on its
website allowing consumers to correct erroneous data.' 0 While the
ramifications of such mistakes are arguably lower in commercial
settings, commercial data is no longer used only commercially: the NSA
and law enforcement agencies tie into these databases and use them to
feed criminal prediction systems, magnifying the harms of data errors
and flawed interpretations. 10 1 Moreover, the likelihood of such data
Agent Cites Supposedly Private Medical Details, STAR, Nov. 28, 2013, http://www.thestar.com/

news/gta/2013/l1/28/disabledwoman denied entry tous after-agent-cites supposedly_priva
te medical details.html.
96. David C. Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, The Right to QuantitativePrivacy, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 62, 81 (2013).
97. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1256-57 (2008).
98. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promisesof Privacy: Responding to the SurprisingFailureof
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1703-06 (2010), available at http://www.uclalaw
review.org/pdf/57-6-3 .pdf.
99. See id.
100. Natasha Singer, A Data Broker Offers a Peek Behind the Curtain,N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/business/a-data-broker-offers-a-peek-behind-the-

curtain.html.
101. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, US., British Intelligence Mining Datafrom
Nine US. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-inter
net-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/.
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errors is even greater in non-structured data collection (e.g., NSA
systems that glean data directly from internet pipelines and attempt to
decrypt, sort, and re-identify its source).
An intrinsic limitation of predictive systems that is often
unrecognized or glossed over in discussions of effectiveness is the error
rate-all predictive systems are wrong sometimes, and the algorithms
must be "tuned" to find the right balance between false positives and
false negatives. 102 In a criminal prediction context, a false negative is
when the system mistakenly allows a guilty individual to slip through.
However, a false positive is when an innocent person is suspected of
being guilty, the consequences of which are unnecessary violations of
that person's privacy and liberty interests. The true problem of false
positives comes from a statistical phenomenon known as the "base rate
fallacy," which emerges in situations where a large number of "normal"
profiles have to be scrutinized, but the incidence of the target profile is
very small. 10 3 This fundamental statistical limitation dictates that even
an unrealistically accurate predictive model will likely create
error rates in a large population with a few rare
unacceptable
04
matches. 1

Security expert Bruce Schneier describes the problem with an
example of a system designed to spot terrorist plots that is 99% accurate
as to false-positives and 99.9% accurate as to false negatives. Assuming
a volume of a trillion scrutinized events (ten calls, emails, web
transactions, per U.S. citizen per day-likely a very low estimate), the
system will create a billion false positives per day. Assuming that there
are ten or so actual terrorists plotting at a given time, the resource
requirements to investigate that many matches are unreasonable. Even
"tuning" the algorithms to raise the false-positive accuracy to 99.9999%
still creates 2,750 false alarms per day-also likely unworkable. More
importantly, however, such tuning will now likely cause the system to
miss a few of the 10 real plots. As a practical matter, such accuracy
levels are probably unrealistic, anyway. 10 5 As a reality check on
accuracy, the FBI considers it acceptable to make erroneous matches
20% of •the time 106in its Next Generation Identification biometric
matching program.
However, human misunderstanding of the limits of automated
predictive systems goes beyond a misapprehension of statistical theory.
102. Bruce Schneier, Why Data Mining Won't Stop Terror, WIRED, Mar. 9, 2006,
20 0 6 3 7 3 5 7
.
/0 / 0
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/
103. Id.

104.
105.

Id.
See id.; see also SLOBOGIN, supra note 59, at 194-95.

106. EPIC FOIA - FBI Says 20% Error Rate Okay for Facial Recognition, EPIC.ORG
(Oct. 4, 2013), http://epic.org/2013/10/epic-foia---bi-says-20-error-.html.
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People have an intrinsic trust in computer-based operations generallyand machine computation specifically-which lacks a rational basis.
Computer scientist Jaron Lanier has noted how readily humans will
adapt their own expectations and behaviors to conform to the quirks of
automated systems, often without noticing their tacit acceptance of new
limitations.1 7 In decision systems specifically, study after study across
numerous disciplines has confirmed the phenomenon of "automation
bias [that] occurs in decision-making because humans have a tendency
to disregard or not search for contradictory information in light of a
computer-generated solution that is accepted as correct." ' s This
phenomenon occurs in part because of trust in automation and in part
because, over time, people become unpracticed at applying the rules
that systems help them automate.1 0 9 In other words, humans learn by
repeatedly Practicing the menial rules that predictive systems automate
for them." When the time comes to review the machine's decisions,
they lack both the confidence and the experience to overrule the
machine's mistakes or to second-guess its decisions."' On its face, it
seems a plausible claim that predictive crime systems would not be
problematic because they are mixed-mode-subject to human review
before any action is taken. Automation bias and its underlying causes
are important to understand because they show that even mixed-mode
systems have little chance of reducing errors in decision making or
mitigating their consequences, even when malfunction is suspected by a
supervising human."l l Thus, "[a]utomation bias effectively turns a
computer program's suggested answer into a trusted final decision."'' 3
B. Side-Effects: Bias and Norm-Shaping
Aside from the concern that such systems may be too resourceburdensome to implement, one expert critic has noted, "Actuarial
107. See JARON LANIER, You ARE NOT A GADGET: A MANIFESTO 9-13 (2010)
[hereinafter LANIER, You ARE NOT A GADGET].

108. M.L. Cummings, Automation Bias in Intelligent Time Critical Decision Support
Systems 1 (unpublished manuscript, available at http://web.mit.edu/aeroastro/labs/halab/papers/
CummingsAlAAbias.pdf) (last accessed Dec. 17, 2013).
109.
110.

Id.at 2.
See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1272 (2008).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1271-72.

113.

Id. at 1272; see also Sabrina A. Lochner, Saving Face: Regulating Law

Enforcement's Use of Mobile FacialRecognition Technology & Iris Scans, 55 ARIZ. L. REV.

201, 220 (2013) (noting that the MORIS facial recognition system "seemingly creates a de facto
lineup in the field where police must identify a person from three photographs returned after a
database search" and recommending that police lineup procedures be used to avoid suggestive
or biased results).
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methods in the criminal justice field produce hidden distortions with
significant costs for society."' "14 One such distortion emerges from the
ideological imprint inevitably left on a system during design, when
policy rules are crafted into code. There are two aspects to this
distortion which emerge at different levels of coding-research agenda
bias and policy bias.
Long before specific rules and policies are encoded into a given
automated predictive system, basic choices must be made by the tools
vendors that develop big data analytics systems and software. The
ultimate conclusion of predictive policing-that macro-level events
(i.e., human behaviors) can be predicted given enough data points and a
sophisticated enough model-requires an almost ideological
presumption of determinism.' 1 5 While this presumption is overt among
the leaders of Silicon Valley companies today,'' 6 it may or may not be
shared by the population at large. Proponents have had difficulty in
questioning the core principles of the "research agenda" of big data,
acknowledging the validity of methodological critiques, and developing
strategies to minimize bias.' 1 7 The consequences have shown
themselves through numerous high-profile research scandals and a
general questioning of the validity of much scientific research. 118
Before rules even begin to be coded, lead up activities can leave an
impression. Early activities, such as the selection of initial databases to
incorporate and search, the filtering and converting of data from those
119 leave subtle
databases, and the type of data analysis to perform,
traces. As one critic puts it: "Mathematicians model misunderstandings
of the world, often using the data at hand instead of chasing down the
hidden facts." 120 Biases which may have existed in those feeder
databases, now masked by another layer of abstraction, combine with
other biases to compound problems. Those early activities, in turn,
create spurious correlations and errors which human analysis (again,
potentially biased) must discount or emphasize. The recognition of
patterns in data is "informed by values about what makes a pattern and
114.
115.
116.

HARCOURT, supra note 54, at 21.
See Julie Cohen, What Privacyis For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1924 (2013).
See JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? 165 (Kindle ed. 2013).

117. See Cohen, supra note 115, at 1924; see also John Timmer, Is It Time to Up the
Statistical Standard for Scientific Results? ARsTECHNICA, Nov. 12, 2013, http://arstechnica.
com/science/2013/1 /is-it-time-to-up-the-statistical-standard-for-scientific-results/#p3
("Research fraud is rising, but even studies that were performed properly sometimes either can't
be reproduced or appear to suffer from bias.").
118. See David H. Freedman, Lies, Damned Lies, and Medical Science, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Nov. 2010, at 40, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/
1 /lies-damned-lies-and-medical-science/308269/; see also Timmer, supra note 117.
119. See BAKER, supra note 43, at 83-89.
120. Id. at 215.
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why."'
All of this occurs before predictive models are codified by
dovetailing the patterns into more general public and administrative
policy rules. To be sure, all policy-making is, in a sense, an effort to
craft underlying values into administrable rules. However, during that
process, programmer codification of the rules of complex policies may
be biased or in error, ultimately amounting to hidden new policy.
Over time, there is even the worry that rules that are easier to code into
automation systems may be self-selected and thus have a reverse
influence on the definition of administrative policies, in essence the
ultimate negative consequence of automation bias.' 23 Even a seemingly
simple act, such as setting initial tolerances for false positive and
negatives, is often an obscure policy decision.
Once a predictive system has been implemented, other subtle side
effects may emerge. The process of predictive simulation ultimately
makes the model the "signifier of reference"-it reverses the normal
flow wherein reality tests the model and instead makes the predictive
model the validator of reality.' 24 In the first place, this is a problem
because any biases in the model introduced in the design process tend to
be magnified by self-reinforcement. However, even relatively unbiased
models may be plagued by self-reinforcement: police look for crime
where the model tells them to look, and each time they find it the model
seems more valid-much like the proverbial drunk who only looks for
his keys under the streetlight because that is where the light is. 125 There
is significant evidence that this kind of observation bias is already
happening in existing predictive systems: San Francisco Police
Department chief information officer Susan Merritt decided to proceed
with caution, noting "In L.A. I heard that many officers were only
patrolling the red boxes [displayed by the PredPol system], not other
areas. People became too focused on the boxes, and they had to come
' 126
up with a slogan, 'Think outside the box."
121.
122.

Cohen, supranote 115, at 1924.
Danielle Keats Citron, TechnologicalDue Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1279

(2008) (describing the Colorado CBMS system and how "programmers changed hundreds of
established rules when encoding them into the system, [with the consequence that] CBMS also
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123. Id. at 1297-98; see also Nate Anderson, TSA's Got 94 Signs to ID Terrorists, But
They're Unproven by Science, ARSTECHNICA (Nov. 13, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2013/1 l/despite-lack-of-science-tsa-spent-millions-on-behavioral-detection-officers/.
124.
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TELEMATIC SOCIETIES 72 (1996).
125. BAKER, supranote 43, at 216.
126. Darwin Bond-Graham & Ali Winston, All Tomorrow's Crimes: The Future of
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Consider an extended example: Say that big data analysis tells the
police that there is a minor correlation between speeding and drugtrafficking. As a result, speeding becomes a profiled characteristic in the
predictive model. However, the correlation may occur only because
traffic stops enable police to search the car, not because speeders tend to
be drug traffickers. The "model" works: by stopping speeders, police do
indeed arrest more drug traffickers, in line with the model's correlation.
Over time, this leads to the conclusion that speeders traffic drugs, and
the increased policing of speeders becomes a police focus.
One reason this happens is that the models tend to be evaluated
according to their success rate in finding the crime, rather than their
success rate in reducing the profiled crime and its societal policing
costs. 127 According to one critic, even predictive systems with an
accurate model suffer from a flawed assumption: that those in the
predicted "profile" group react to policing efforts similarly to those not
in the group. 128 In populations where they do not, policing the target
group may not reduce the incidence of the targeted crime and may even
increase it. 12 9 In our hypothetical, the undesirable result is that police
have increased the resources devoted to policing speeders in service of a
non-predictive correlation that merely regurgitates its own numbers
back at a higher economic cost to society. In addition, society now has
an unnecessary, and erroneous, group bias against speeders as being
drug traffickers (i.e., norms have been reshaped in service of the model,
rather than being reflected in the model). Thus, even facially effective
predictive models may have significant, negative societal side-effects.
IV. SIDE EFFECTS: PRIVACY HARMS
The right to privacy, though not specifically scripted in the Bill of
Rights, emerges as a "penumbra" emanating from the First, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendments.' 30 Typically, the Fourth Amendment (and, to a
lesser extent, the Fifth) has governed privacy in a criminal procedure
context, while the First Amendment has sanctified privacy in intellect,
association, communication, and the exploration of new ideas.
A. FourthAmendment
In theory, the Fourth Amendment guards against unnecessarily
intrusive breaches of individuals' privacy for the purposes of
127.
128.

HARCOuRT, supra note 54, at 139-40.
Id. at 22-23.

129.

Id. at 24.

130.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).

JOURNAL TECHNOLOGY OFLA WAND POLICY

[Vol. 19

investigating or preventing criminal activities, serving "as a bulwark
against law enforcement's teleological tendency toward a surveillance
state."' 3 1 The foundational concept in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
is "probable cause," and traditionally searches of persons, documents,
and homes require a warrant in which the government must articulate a
specific set of facts showing that it is reasonable to believe the targeted
person has committed a crime. 132 Over time, however, that relatively
rigorous standard has been relaxed for certain kinds of searches. For
example, police may "stop and frisk" people if they have a "reasonable
suspicion" that they may be engaged in criminal activity.'33 Other
"special" kinds of searches, such as those inside a school,
have
gradually come to fall under this relaxed standard. 134 Much electronic
information is accessible under an even lower standard, "relevance" to
an investigation, which allows law enforcement to utilize subpoenas to
accomplish most routine suspicion-less data gathering. 135 Furthermore,
the development of the concomitant third-party doctrine and the
"reasonable expectation of privacy" doctrine enables many electronic
activities to be labeled "non-private," exempting them from even the
low "relevance" standard. 3 6 There are so many exceptions to the
warrant process now that individualized suspicion is no longer required
for most types of searches, short of physical searches of one's home. 37
While the widespread use of surveillance technology by federal
agencies against a largely guiltless populace may, in itself, be legally
questionable in light of the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
general warrants, that question will remain unexplored here. Even if
total surveillance is legally justifiable, however, there remain several
related questions concerning the scope of the use of transactional data in
big data analytics and in criminal prediction.
It is worth noting that the term "probable cause" unavoidably
requires a forward-looking viewpoint. Since probable cause analysis
must be performed prospectively, the "probability" of the government
finding what it asked to look for is inherent in the concept. Thus, what
is at issue is not so much the use of predictive probabilities per se, but
the balance between two aspects of the analysis: the quality and
specificity of the prediction versus the depth and breadth of the privacy
intrusion. This is, in essence, the proportionality principle which Terry
purported to apply in order to arrive at the lower "reasonableness"
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Gray & Citron, supra note 96, at 92.
JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 47 (2008).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
New Jersey v. TLO, 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
MILLS, supra note 132, at 47-48.
See id.at 281-82.
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE 126 (2011).
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38
standard for stop and frisk situations'
It is also helpful to distinguish two related understandings of
"privacy intrusion" in the Fourth Amendment context. One way of
understanding the privacy interest at stake in non-particularized
searches is to consider the "unjustified burden" to those who would be
searched unnecessarily. 139 Under this conception, mere information
analysis is fair game because, so long as the person whose data is
reviewed does not know about it, there is no violation of privacy
Judge Richard Posner
because there is no troublesome intrusion.
14 1
espoused this theory in a recent op-ed piece. However, a related but
more subtle way of understanding the privacy interest is as a "dignity
interest," which perceives the search as an offense to dignity whether or
not anyone knows about it. 14 2 Conceiving of the search this way would
mean that using automated agents to predict behaviors qualifies as an
offense to dignity and thus requires authorities to apply some form or
proportionality review. The two views are not necessarily exclusive.
Professor Slobogin has argued that the jurisprudence that has
emerged around the proportionality principle of Terry is flawed because
the principle is applied selectively to special cases instead of uniformly
to all Fourth Amendment analysis." If properly applied to group
searches, for example, the principle would dictate that the searchyield a
4
positive result for a substantial percentage of those searched.' This
138.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.

139.

LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.0, at

211 (2006), available at http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2.pdf.
140. Id.; see also Mike Masnick, Mike Rogers: You Can't Have Your Privacy Violated If
You Don't Know About It, TECHDIRT (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20131029/18020225059/mike-rogers-you-canthave-yurprivay-violated-ifyou-dontknow-ab
out-it.shtml (Recently, some have called this the "Rogers Doctrine," after Rep. Mike Rogers,
who stated during recent NSA hearings that "You can't have your privacy violated if you don't
know your privacy is violated.").
141. Richard A. Posner, Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at
5
2
A31, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 00 /12/20/AR200
5122001053.html.
The collection, mainly through electronic means, of vast amounts of personal
data is said to invade privacy. But machine collection and processing of data
cannot, as such, invade privacy. Because of their volume, the data are first
sifted by computers, which search for names, addresses, phone numbers, that
may have intelligence value. This initial sifting, far from invading privacy (a
computer is not a sentient being), keeps most private data from being read by

any intelligence officer.
Id.
142.
143.
144.

LESSIG, supra note 139, at 211-12.
SLOBOGIN, supra note 59, at 22-23.
LESSIG, supra note 139, at 212.
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analysis is relevant here because widespread automated review of the
private data of largely guiltless individuals is what might be considered
a dragnet search that has low predictive specificity and quality, thus
violating the dignity interest. 145 However, even if the argument can be
made that the data is not private because of the reasonable expectation
and third-party doctrines,
a significant proportion of false positives
may mean that the privacy intrusion is too great to justify the results
147
under the "unjustified burden" conception of the privacy interest.
Considering some of the predictive crime models from the
proportionality review perspective can be instructive. Take, for
example, predictive models that direct police to "crime hot spots." Are
officers able to stop and search people because the prediction itself
satisfies some aspect of reasonable suspicion? It seems so. In Illinois v.
Wardlow, the Supreme Court ruled that the moniker "high crime area"
was a significant enough factor in the totality of the circumstances
analysis of reasonable suspicion that it could be one of only two factors
to justify a stop-and-frisk (the other being flight by the suspect upon
seeing the police nearby).' 14 A recent police stop captured on video in
Philadelphia shows how quickly the second factor in the totality of the
circumstances test can become merely nominative. 49 The video shows
two men who were detained by police because they greeted another
person while walking down the street. 150 According to the officers,
greeting others in the high crime neighborhood was a sufficiently
abnormal behavior to be worthy of suspicion.' 5
In Wardlow, the labeling of the area as "high crime," presumably
justified by retrospective crime data, is somewhat different from the
prospective designation of an area as likely to have a 10% increased
chance of burglaries today, as determined by the systems in use in
Memphis and other cities. 152 However, the parallels to predictive hotspot modeling are clear: if the mere label of "high crime area" is almost
completely sufficient for reasonable suspicion, a computerized
145.
146.

Id.at 211.
Slobogin would argue that both of these doctrines are flawed because they fail to

conduct the proportionality analysis properly. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 59, at 31-32.
147. See LESSIG, supra note 139, at 21 1.
148. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); see also United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (discussing the totality of the circumstances test).
149. See Josh Moyo, Police Unlawful Harassmentand RacialProfiling9/27/13 Philly, Pa,
YouTUBE (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-G4exZ-jXgWE; see also Morgan
Winsor & Rande laboni, 16-minute Video of Philly Cops in Controversial Stop Sparks
Criticism, Probe, CNN (Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/17/us/video-police-stopphiladelphia/ (link to full video in article).
150. Winsor & aboni, supra note 149.
151. Id.
152. See Memphis Police DepartmentReduces Crime Rates, supranote 80.
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prediction will likely carry at least as much weight.
Considering Wardlow and its effect on subsequent police behavior,
"area" crime prediction models have the potential to significantly
impact individuals' privacy when they live or work in the targeted area.
Behaviors as innocent as greeting someone may become suspicious,
causing widespread, unjustified harassment of innocent persons and
substantial damage to personal dignity, as is evident from the
Philadelphia video. 53 These models should fail on proportionality
review and on both the unjustified burden and dignity interest
conceptions of the Fourth Amendment privacy guarantees.
A second predictive context is prediction based on shared group
attributes, or profiling. Courts have generally been receptive to the idea
of using shared group attributes as the basis for a police stop. In United
States v. Sokolow, the Supreme Court upheld the DEA's use of a "drug
courier profile" that consisted of several factors which, in and of
themselves, were neither criminal nor suspicious. 154 The Court did not
address the specific constitutionality of a predictive profile as such, but
acknowledged that such a profile was not inappropriate merely by being
probabilistic in nature 155and was allowable under a totality of the
circumstances analysis.
For the purposes of the present discussion, the relevant group
attributes would have been culled from large volumes of data using big
data analytics, and thus would possess value only as statistical
correlation, not causal theory. On its face, the determinative issue in a
proportionality analysis would seem to be how well the group attributes
predict the crime (i.e., finding most of the criminals with the least
burden on the innocent). While false negatives are less of a problem for
privacy, a large number of false positives should fail the proportionality
review.
Interestingly, the Court in Sokolow lacked any objective evidence of
the profile's predictive value, and looked dimly on the Ninth Circuit's
belief that any was necessary. 156 This is troubling in light of the
153. See Winsor & laboni, supra note 149.
154. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (Two of the factors were paying
cash for an airplane ticket and visiting Miami from Honolulu in July for only 48 hours).
155. Id. at 8-10
156. Id. at 6.
The majority [of the Ninth Circuit judges] believed that such characteristics,
"shared by drug couriers and the public at large," were only relevant if there
was evidence of ongoing criminal behavior and the Government offered
"[e]mpirical documentation' that the combination of facts at issue did not
describe the behavior of 'significant numbers of innocent persons." Applying
this two-part test to the facts of this case, the majority found that there was no
evidence of ongoing criminal behavior, and thus that the agents' stop was
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methodological questions raised earlier, especially the tendency for
predictive systems to become self-reinforcing when officers begin to
detain, disproportionately to other populations, those who fit the profile.
This apparent success will further validate the use of such profiling in
reasonable suspicion analysis.
No Supreme Court case seems to have dealt with the question of
reasonable suspicion emerging purely and solely from a probabilistic
system. However, it is clear from Sokolow that a profile, whether or not
it has predictive value, may become sufficient for reasonable suspicion
when added to some feeling, intuition, or observation the officer
makes. 157 This suggests that a seemingly objective criterion is in fact
much more prone to bias than it seems at first blush. 158 In fact, the lack
of a case on the matter suggests not that the Court would prohibit a
search where reasonable suspicion was based on pure probability, but
instead that it is nearly always possible for an officer to find a feeling,
intuition, or observation to purify a profile, before or after the fact.
How courts will ultimately rule on many of these questions is
unknown, but it should be clear that predictive crime systems have the
capability to factor significantly into future Fourth Amendment
analysis. If those models are not predictively accurate, there will be
harms to the privacy interests of individuals erroneously caught in their
dragnet. Unless courts or legislatures undertake a substantial policy
shift, few barriers remain in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to hinder
these damaging outcomes.
B. FirstAmendment
At first blush, it may be difficult to see what the First Amendment
has to do with predicting criminal behavior. After all, the First
Amendment is supposed to guarantee that the government does not
restrict certain expressive activities-speech, association, belief, and
religion-unnecessarily. 59 The First Amendment protects intellectual
inquiry and allows individuals to find and discuss ideas with likeminded people; these activities are protected because they are
considered essential
functioning democracy.'
death
threats and conspiracytotoacommit
murder-criminal in However,
nature-are not

impermissible.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
157. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 10.
158. See Charles L. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: "All Seems Infected That th'
Infected Spy, AsAllLooks Yellow to the Jaundic'dEye," 65 N.C. L. REV. 417, 429-30 (1987).

159.
160.

See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
SOLOVE, supra note 137, at 27.
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protected First Amendment behaviors.
In light of this, to paraphrase a common question, "Why do
suspected criminals need protection against search, surveillance, and
predictive analysis at all? If the systems work some of the time, why not
use them? Those with nothing to hide have nothing to fear."
Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment has been viewed as governing
criminal procedure by regulating the boundaries of government conduct
altogether16f
and the First Amendment as governing a different thing
Yet, it would be narrow thinking to conclude that the Fourth
Amendment has nothing to do with free speech. In fact, to understand
is to
the Fourth Amendment's common roots with the First Amendment
systems.'1 62
predictive
of
harm
foundational
the
understand
In the eighteenth century, the British government prosecuted
63
thousands of individuals for sedition in order to quell dissent.' General
warrants were common at the time and, in one famous case, were used
to search the home and papers of John Wilkes, the anonymous publisher
of a pamphlet criticizing the king. 164 Widespread celebration in the
colonies ensued when Wilkes won his case by challenging the validity
of the warrant. 165 Such events were the historical backdrop of the First
Amendment right to speech, but also the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against searches by the government to see what turns up. According to
one commentator, "The Fourth Amendment emerges from 'a tradition
that has more to do with protecting free speech than with regulating the
police.""

166

To turn Justice Douglas's famous statement in Griswold on its head,
it may be fairer to say that the necessity of intellectual privacy to a
functioning democracy creates the penumbra that is the First and Fourth
Amendments.1 67 For this reason, Professor Solove believes that "The
First Amendment should serve as an independent source of criminal
procedure, ' 68 especially in light of the limited usefulness of the Fourth
169
In other words,
Amendment in protecting. informational privacy.

systems of information gathering and prediction that target criminal
reference to their First
behavior should be explicitly analyzed with 170
whole.
a
as
populace
the
on
Amendment effects
161.
162.

Id. at 146.
Id. at 147.

163. Id.
164. Id.; see Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.).
165. SOLOVE, supra note 137, at 148.
166. Id. (citing William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105
YALE L.J. 393, 398 (1995)).
167. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484 (1965).
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SOLOVE, supra note 137, at 150.
Id. at 152.

170.

Id.; see also Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV.
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If First Amendment issues are appropriate to consider in the criminal
prediction context, then it is critical to understand precisely how these
systems, built on total surveillance, may damage democratic societies.
Our society highly prizes human freedom, creativity, and uniqueness.
Our desire to preserve these human qualities places them among the
fundamental normative concepts in the pantheon of democratic
values. 17 1 The Constitution recognizes that overly constraining human
behavior with legal restrictions might have the effect of quelling the
development of ideas at the margins of normality, and that often those
borderline ideas are where progress is made in society. It is widely
believed by scholars that widespread surveillance damages the ability of
humans to engage in those "abnormal" behaviors because it deters
people from "engaging in thoughts or deeds that others might find
deviant. Surveillance thus menaces our society's foundational
commitments to intellectual diversity and eccentric individuality."' 72 In
situations where people are constantly watched, the psychological
pressure to conform to norms is extremely high, even when those
watched have only a generalized idea of why they are being watched
and what constitutes the "normal" behavior. I73 In short, "surveillance
inclines us to the mainstream and the boring,"'1 74 and this shift, over
time, may cause a society to lose its creativity and stagnate. The
"chilling effect" doctrine of First Amendment law recognizes that, as a
society, we should be suspicious of attempts to regulate speech, even
175
borderline speech, and should err on the side of permissiveness.
However, scholars have only recently begun to criticize the chilling
effect of widespread surveillance on First Amendment grounds, and to
argue that a notion of "intellectual privacy" is needed to protect these
core values against surveillance.' 17 "For better and for worse I. .
privacy is sponsor and guardian to the creative and the subversive."' 77
Prediction of behavior is the final extension into spatial privacy,
imposing normalization by its preemption of free action. 178 Predictive
1934, 1951 (2013) (noting that courts are mistaken to view surveillance solely as a Fourth
Amendment issue, and should also consider First Amendment values).
171. Richards, supra note 170, at 1946-47.
172. Id. at 1948; see also, e.g., BENTHAM, supra note 64, at 29-80; FOUCAULT, supra
note 64.

173.

Richards, supra note 170, at 1948-49; see generally BOGARD, supra note 1, at 55-

77.
174. Richards, supra note 170, at 1948.
175. Id.at 1949-50; see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
176. Richards, supra note 170, at 1950; see also United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945,
956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
177.

Richards, supra note 170, at 1950 (quoting TIMOTHY MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF

MIND 36 (2006)).
178.

See JULIE COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF 143, 149 (2012).
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systems amplify and multiply the chilling effect of surveillance in
several ways. First and most obviously, predictive systems make
surveillance known to people by integrating it into systems that actually
constrain their free behavior.' 79 The vague instinct one is being watched
becomes tangible when a person is placed on a watch list like the "no
fly" list and denied access to air travel or subjected to heightened
screening procedures; denied access to jobs or credit; or subjected to a
"stop and frisk." As Jay Stanley of the ACLU put it, "over time, as the
ramifications of big data analytics sink in, people will likely become
much more conscious of the ways they're being tracked, and 'the
80
considerable."'
chilling effects on all sorts of behaviors could become
Citizens do not really know which behaviors have contributed to
their placement on the heightened scrutiny list; and they do not
18
precisely know how they were watched to be placed there. However,
they will self-censor to conform to an illusory model of normality-the
second way predictive systems amplify the harms to First Amendment
values. 182 When humans are merely watched, they will confine
themselves to behaviors that they view to be un-embarrassing and
relatively mainstream.' 83 When humans are subjected to analysis by a
predictive system built on actuarial data, they will adapt their behavior
not even to that robust "normal" man or woman, but to a shallow
184
In part, this occurs
caricature-a predictive "straw man" normal.
to make it more
behavior
their
conform
because people will
interpretable to technology, rather than demanding that technology
conform to their quirks. 185 Thus, the age of prediction marks the next
The images used in
transition in our relationship with images.
the fact that reality
concealing
of
function
the
prediction "now have
The profiles created are
itself is absent behind its representation."
false, but they come to have more reality than the real behaviors from
are compiled. 188 Because the profile is guaranteed to "serve
which they
up an offender," it is "true" regardless of its accuracy, and the real
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184. Id. (recalling his own self-consciousness about clicking on friends' updates after
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individual who fits the profile is largely irrelevant. 189 Thus, this shadow
of correlations becomes the model of reference by which citizens selfcensor.
There are now such a quantity and diversity of federal crimes that
government agencies cannot even count them, much less prosecute
everyone who commits a crime. 9 Today, perhaps the biggest guarantor
of intellectual privacy is that the sheer volume of people and behaviors
to assess means that most citizens "slip by" under the radar when they
innocently commit a crime or engage in several behaviors that together
might make a profile.' 91 However, when predictive analysis of behavior
is automated by linked databases and statistical techniques, intellectual
privacy is harmed by allowing punishment (and normalization) to
become total, inexorable, and non-discretionary. Because the ultimate
objective of surveillance is not prosecutorial evidence-gathering but the
disciplined self-normalization of behavior by the citizenry-optimally,
without governmental expenditure-certain elements within society will
not necessarily regard these trends with alarm. 192 However, that
hegemony is problematic because it removes what Julie Cohen calls
"semantic discontinuity," a by-product of disparate systems which
"preserv[es] breathing room for personal boundary management and the
93
play of everyday practice."1
That "breathing room" is none other than the disorganization that
creativity needs to synthesize new ideas-the very same creativity we
try to preserve with First Amendment protections. It is necessary also
for a very simple technical reason: big data cannot correlate data that
does not yet exist. Predictive systems are all about constraints, but
humans must have enough room to move so that they can freely act
outside the models that constrain them, otherwise those models have no
new input. In the words of one critic of big data:
What is greatest about human beings is precisely what the
algorithms and silicon chips don't reveal, what they can't reveal
because it can't be captured in data. It is not the "what is," but the
"what is not": the empty space, the cracks in the sidewalk, the
189. Id. at 28.
190. Moxie Marlinspike, Why 'I Have Nothing to Hide' is the Wrong Way to Think About
Surveillance, WIRED (June 6, 2013), http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/06/why-i-have-

nothing-to-hide-is-the-wrong-way-to-think-about-surveillance/ (citing law professor James
Duane and Justice Breyer).
191. One attorney has estimated that Americans commit three felonies per day. See
generally HARVEY SILVERGLATE, THREE FELONIES A DAY (2009).

192. See Mike Masnick, Creating Chilling Effects on Speech is a Feature, Not a Bug, Of
the Surveillance State, TECHDIRT (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130822/
19270124286/.

193.

Cohen, supra note 115, at 1931-32.
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unspoken and the not-yet-thought. This has important
implications for the notion of progress in society. Big data
enables us to experiment faster and explore more leads. These
advantages should produce more innovation. But the spark of
invention becomes what the data does not say. ...If Henry Ford

had queried big-data algorithms for what his customers wanted,
they would have replied "a faster horse.' 94
V. SPECULATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES

Potential refinements to traditional legal doctrine have been
discussed above, including undertaking a more robust Fourth
Amendment proportionality review and re-conceptualizing the First
Amendment as integral to a criminal procedure analysis. However, it
seems unlikely that minor tweaks to the existing First and Fourth
Amendment canon will constitute a complete solution in the face of
rapid technological change. New and different conceptions of data,
privacy, and the scope of free human action-conceptions capable of
incorporating the technological and economic drivers of the twenty-first
century-will likely be needed.
A. "Quantitative'"Privacy Rights
The advent of gigantic databases filled with personal, behavioral,
and biometric data has prompted some commentators to note a disparity
between traditional analyses of privacy violations and the new
technological realities.' 95 Traditional analyses of privacy have focused
on the quality of the intrusion-whether the person was in a private
law enforcement.196
space and whether personal chattel was touched by
However, the fundamental premise of big data processing techniques is
that the discrete bits of data assembled in databases together can form a
sufficient picture of an individual to predict his or her behavior. So far,
privacy law has been mostly unable to grapple with the notion that
thousands of small acts of data gathering--each individually unharmful, authorized by the user, or gathered by different parties-may
violation. 97
in their total, quantitative volume create a privacy
Recently, however, a concept of "quantitative privacy" has gained
traction with the Supreme Court; in United States v. Jones, five justices
194.

VIKTOR MAYER SCHONBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT

WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 196-97 (Kindle ed. 2013).
195. See Gray & Citron, supra note 96, at 83-92.
196. Id.at 83-84.
197. Id. at 67-68.
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voiced concerns about the total effect of this massive data gathering. 198
The five justices appeared to endorse a case-by-case test for each
specific investigation to determine whether the volume and type of data
gathering was proper under the Fourth Amendment. 199 Thus, the
analysis might focus on whether, in the hypothetical case of Bob, it was
proper to do phone location tracking for a day, a week, or a month. This
interpretation seems to be consistent with a case prior to Jones heard by
the D.C. Court of Appeals. 200 Commentators have labeled this the
"mosaic" theory.20 1
However, the mosaic theory has been criticized for appearing to
conflict with prior Court doctrine and for lack of justiciability. 2°2
Primarily, the mosaic theory fails to account for technological advances,
depending too much on the outdated crutches of reasonable expectation
and the third-party doctrine for its analysis. 20 3 Some critics advocate a
different approach: if an investigative technology can "facilitate broad
programs of indiscriminate surveillance," then that particular technology
is subject to Fourth Amendment regulation.20 4 A court would review the
suspect technology generally, 20 5 then approve technology-specific rules,
procedures and practices that balance citizen and law enforcement
interests. 2 ° This approach has the advantage of using traditional
procedural methods to challenge the constitutionality of general police
procedures, a particular warrant, or conduct during a search, but it
rationalizes a different inquiry from the classic third-party and
reasonable expectation doctrine which has become so difficult to
effectively apply in the advancing technological age.207
B. A Right to Due Process in Automated Systems
The term "black box effect" is sometimes used to express human
uncertainty about a technological system when biases, unknowns,
complexity, and secrecy compound to such an extent that the system
seems incomprehensible. The term connotes a system in which inputs198.

See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring);

see id. at 957 (Alito, J., concurring).
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here, statistical behavioral and biometric data-are converted into
adjudications (risk of criminality), but the machinations inside the
"black box" are impenetrable to those being judged and often opaque
even to their custodians. All of these problems exist in an environment
that lacks a meaningful process for challenge.
Contributors to the black box effect may be found on each level of
system design, implementation, functioning, and maintenance, and
examples of each in automated systems are common. At the most basic
level, citizens being judged and scrutinized by "secret" systems like
those developed by the NSA are the ultimate black box victims in that
20 8
they do not even know whether or how their lives are being impacted.
Additionally, the data forming the source for judgment may be flawed,
and because it is compiled from so many diverse systems it is difficult
even to know this. 209 Furthermore, in Part III, this Article alluded to the
subtle biases that can creep into systems when policy rules are coded
into algorithmic rules and when statistical predictions begin to selfreinforce. A corollary to the problem of algorithmic bias is
complexity-code may return incorrect results because of unintended
flaws in the algorithms, and the overall complexity of the system may
make it difficult or impossible to perceive these flaws, much less correct
them. 2 For example, a senior intelligence official recently admitted to
Congress that the NSA had failed to fully inform the FISC court of
necessary details about a call-monitoring program because "no one at
NSA had a full understanding of how the program was operating at the
time.,,211

Lastly, adjudications and results may be shared between entities,
further compounding the difficulties with challenging outcomes and
auditability. In a particularly egregious example, it was recently
revealed that the NSA was sharing information with the DEA and other
2 12
Because the NSA's systems were top secret,213DEA
agencies.
have
Someagents
had to re-develop the provided evidence by other means.
208. See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Court Says Feds Don't Have to Reveal Secret Evidence It
Gathered Against 'Terror' Suspect Using FISA, TECHDIRT (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.tech
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209. See text accompanying notes 99-102.
210. See text accompanying notes 116-24.
211. Cyrus Farivar, NSA: No One "Had a Full Understanding" of 2009 Call-checking
Program, ARSTECHNICA (Sept. 10, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/09/nsa-no-

one-had-a-full-understanding-of-2009-call-checking-program/ (quoting Robert Litt, general
counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence).
212. John Shiffman & Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: U.S. Directs Agents to Cover Up
Program Used to Investigate Americans, REUTERS (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/08/05/us-dea-sod-idUSBRE97409R20130805.
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argued that this violates a fundamental rule of criminal procedure by not
allowing the accused to confront and challenge the evidence against
them in court. 2 14 Even those vaguely aware of the capabilities of NSA
tracking were surprised to find that it had violated its mandate to pursue
only international targets 215
and was also supplying information for
domestic drug enforcement.
Some commentators have noted that these biases, errors, and
unknowns collectively form a critical mass of harms that deprives
citizens of their Fifth Amendment rights to due process. 216 Professor
Danielle Citron argues that, in the first instance, certain kinds of
systems should not be automated because they have a significant
component of human discretion that makes them problematic to codify
into rules.2 17 With their judgment clouded by the promises of
automation in a technological age, builders of systems have failed to see
that the reduction of all adjudicatory process to rules-based systems
rather than standards-based systems may not be appropriate."' The
advent of big-data has worsened this trend by convincing technologists
that they can build systems to predict behavior, even when lacking a
"theory" of causal relationship between attributes and outcomes. In
predictive policing, this trend has been exacerbated by several years of
penalty standardization whose goal was to reduce discretion in
sentencing. 219 According to Citron, however, systems should be
automated only when the "risks associated with human bias outweigh
that of automation bias" and "situation-specific discretion" is not
required.220
Once systems have been automated, processes need to be in place to
challenge the perception of infallibility that automated decisions
engender. This starts with meaningful notice to those targeted by the
adjudication that provides them with an audit trail of the discrete

214. Id.; see also Mike Masnick, Congress Asks Eric Holder to Explain Why NSA Supplies
DEA Info Which It Then Launders to Go After Americans, TECHDIRT (Aug. 28, 2013),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130827/17564624327/congress-asks-eric-holder-to-explain-

why-nsa-supplies-dea-info-which-it-then-launders-to-go-after-americans.shtml.
215. Michael Froomkin, Encryption: The Sky *IS* Falliing, DISCOURSE.NET (Sept. 5,
2013), http://www.discourse.net/2013/09/encryption-the-sky-is-falliing/.
216. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process,85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1305
(2008).
217. Id. at 1304.
218. See id at 1301-03; see also LANIER, You ARE NOT A GADGET, supra note 107, at
9-13,26.
219. See, e.g., Overview, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, http://www.ussc.

gov/About theCommission/index.cfm (last visited Dec. 17, 2013).
220.
(2008).

Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1303
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component decisions made along the way. 22 1 Notice allows individuals
to invoke further administrative processes to challenge decisions,
correct data, explain misinterpretations, and so on. By its very nature,
notice and auditing requires that systems are not secretly applied to
individuals without their knowledge and requires vendors to build
systems and algorithms that they, themselves, can understand well
enough to divulge. Requiring openness in auditing combats the
institutional mentality of secrecy, which allows agencies to hide behind
complexity. Each time an agency claims that a system's inner workings
must remain secret for national security reasons it would be required to
defend that position. Some systems might even be appropriate for
22 2
code is published
complete transparency, wherein the system's source
for review and comment by auditors, academics, and public interest
watch groups.
The formal methods of challenge which need to attend every
automated system are mostly lacking today. For example, passengers
supposedly have the right to petition for removal from the TSA no-fly
list, but223for most challengers, the petitions go unanswered by the
agency. 2 The NSA finds its systems too complex to communicate fully
to the FISA Court, the judicial body that supposedly reviews its actions
for Fourth Amendment compliance. 224 Finally, individuals investigated
by the DEA based on information from the NSA are unable to challenge
because inter-agency secrecy requires DEA to conceal its
the evidence
22 5
source.
To help remedy these problems, front-line hearing officers should be
trained to accept the fallibility of their systems and understand problem
areas. 226 The auditing trail above will assist in explanation, but
administrative and district courts need to be trained in automation and
statistical issues and accustomed to invoking needed procedural
remedies to combat automation bias.2 27 Agencies need to become
comfortable defending their position from courts without reluctance or
indignation. 228 Finally, adjudicatory bodies will need to adjust their
221. Id.at 1305.
222. See id at 1308.
223. Natasha Lennard, No-fly Lists: A New Tactic of Exile?, SALON.COM (Feb. 5, 2013),
http://www.salon.com/2013/02/05/noflylists a-new-tactic-of exile/.
224. See Farivar, supra note 211.
225. See Masnick, supra note 208.
226. Danielle Keats Citron, TechnologicalDue Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1306
(2008).

227. Id. at 1307.
228. Id. The "state secrets privilege" also may represent a barrier to victims challenging
private vendors in tort for incorrect judgments and harms arising from errors in diagnostic
systems. In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), the

state secrets privilege barred the plaintiff from suing a private company that helped with
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understanding of the traditional Mathews v. Elderidge229 cost-benefit
analysis, wherein the level of due process owed to an individual in an
agency action is balanced against the cost and benefit of additional
procedures to remedy wrongs. 23 Adjudicators should recognize that, in
evaluating the benefit of a single due process challenge, a positive
outcome might correct thousands of false or inaccurate predictions. 23 1
C. Economic Rights in My Virtual Proxy?
In the United States, the law views assemblages of personal data as
belonging to the collector of the assemblage, not to the "creator" of the
data (i.e., the being whom the data is "about"). 232 Thus, Facebook,
Acxiom, and Google "own" the data of consumers because they took
the trouble to gather it and, to the extent that customers have
relinquished any privacy right in the data by agreeing to click-through
terms 3of use, those companies may transfer the data to third parties at
23

will.

While this presumption is so fundamentally ingrained in U.S. law
that citizens hardly notice it, it is not the only way of conceiving of
personal data. In fact, in the European Union and in many other
countries, the law conceives of data as belonging to its creator, not to its
collector, consequently iving citizens a much more robust right of
control over their data. For example, the E.U. Directive prohibits the
"processing" of personal data without the authorization of the person,
subject to certain exceptions. 2 35 In addition, several South American
nations have enshrined a constitutional right of "habeas data" that
protects a person's freedom of information, self-determination, and
236
ability to obtain information about oneself.
In these legal regimes, permission to use the data is exclusively the
prerogative of the individual, a notion which maps closely to the
traditional bundle of property rights which includes "the right to
logistical planning for his extraordinary rendition. However, new policies announced by
Attorney General Eric Holder on Sept. 23, 2009 may impact the use of the privilege in litigation.
229.
230.

424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85

WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1283
(2008).
231. Id. at1308.
232. See MILLS, supra note 132, at 62-63.
233. See id; Rick Burgess, FederalCourt: If Users Don't Click, Your Terms of Service is
Invalid,TECHSPOT.COM (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.techspot.com/news/50689-federal-court-if-

users-dont-click-your-terms-of-service-is-invalid.html (noting a recent Nevada federal court
ruling requiring the user to "click" for the click-through terms-of-service to be valid).
234.

See MILLS, supra note 132, at 83.
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Id. at 93.
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237 Thus, using
possess, to use, to exclude, to profit, and to transfer."
property law notions to protect privacy is not new; even U.S. courts
to
have used property theory to restrict access to personal information 2or
38
A
circumstances.
limited
under
provide remedies and damages, albeit
statutory
a
is
key use is the privacy tort of "right of publicity," which
cause of action in many states.239 It covers the "unpermitted use of
identity" stemming from a "property right in [the] persona" measured
by "damage to the value of [the] identity/persona.4F However, the tort
has had limited impact because it is typically viewed as applying to
unpermitted uses strictly in advertising, not to more general commercial

activities.

24 1

Despite these limitations, the seeds of a solution to remedy certain
harms from the use of one's data in prediction may yet be found in
property theory. Property rights are politically and culturally compelling
in today's market-solution-oriented milieu, because policy arguments
with an economic rationale tend to fare better than constitutional rights
to privacy when squared off against national security and public safety
concerns. 242 There are two reasons property theory may ultimately
work: a broader argument and a narrower, subtler one. Both, over time,
will have the effect of lessening surveillance and information gathering
by depriving predictive NSA and policing systems from many sources
of commercial "feeder data., 2 43 The broad argument is that, as a society,
individuals may restrict the use of their data by opting not to use
services without a fair-value trade. 244 In other words, we should "raise
245
our prices" and make data much more costly to gather. This argument
237.
238.
239.

Id. at 207.
See id. at 208.
See id at 173-76.

240. Id. at 173.
241. Id. at 176-77 (noting that the Florida Supreme Court's narrow reading contravenes
broader statutory language).
242.

See id. at 245.

243.

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.

244.

See Josh Klein, Privacy Isn't a Right, SLATE (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.slate.com/

articles/technology/future tense/2013/11/reputation economicsAprivacy_isn t aright it s a c
ommodity.html.
[A] better option might be to simply raise our prices. We can limit how our
personal information is gathered and utilized, and in doing so we can demand
that it be purchased at higher rates than just access to Instagram. It may not
mean cold hard cash (at least not at first), but we can certainly expect more
premium services, more discreet advertising, or even just better control over
who gets our data and for what purposes.
Id.
245.

Id.
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stems not so much from property rights as from people voluntarily
exercising their option not to participate in some online consumer
transactions. The broad argument, then, is that the economic cost of
obtaining data is proportional to the volume and depth of the privacy
intrusion.
The narrower, subtler argument proposed here is that the use of
personal data by companies in predictive simulations should be the
prerogative of the owner, and something for which she is compensated.
This prerogative stems from a recognized property right emerging from
the significant commercial value of the data used in simulation by
companies and government actors. 2 46 The prerogative circumscribes a
person's right to use, exclude others from using, and profit from her
data, creative contributions, movements, and behaviors-those aspects
of personal autonomy that this Article terms a "virtual proxy." Those
property rights naturally would include the actions of a person's virtual
proxy in simulation to solving business or predictive marketing
problems. The proxy or any subset of it may be "sold" by its owner
under this right. The fundamental notion is supported by traditional
property theory, in which ownership derives from the contribution of
individual labor to a product or process. 24 7 In their seminal article on
privacy, Warren and Brandeis argued that "living life itself' imbued
one's personality and information with the labor necessary for a
property right 248-an even more direct, though often forgotten, link to
the compensable value of the lived life.
The question of how society might rationally tie data gathered for
the purposes of simulation to its commercial value is an interesting one
that requires speculative thinking because it differs markedly from the
model in place in today's information economy. Recently, critics have
begun remarking on the "exhausting work of the technology user.' 249
"Siren servers" 25° like Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Amazon
aggregate the billions of tiny contributions made each day by users of
their online services, aggregating user data, selling it, or otherwise
monetizing their creative contributions.51 According to one
246.

See id.

247. MILLS, supra note 132, at 205.
248. Id. at 205-06.
249.

Ian Bogost, Hyperemployment, or the Exhausting Work of the Technology User,

ATLANTIC (Nov. 8, 2013), availableat http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/11/
hyperemployment-or-the-exhausting-work-of-the-technology-user/281149/ (last visited Feb. 19,
2014).
250. LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE?, supra note 116, at 55 ("Siren Servers gather
data from the network, often without having to pay for it. The data is analyzed using the most
powerful available computers, run by the very best available technical people. The results of the
analysis are kept secret, but are used to manipulate the rest of the world to advantage.").
251. Bogost, supra note 249.
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commentator, people have been "duped into contributing free value to
technology companies," essentially working "unpaid jobs ... hustling"
for "unseen bosses." 252 The recent Digital Labor Conference notes the

pervasiveness of these trends: "Every aspect of life drives the digital
economy: sexual desire, boredom, friendship - and all becomes fodder
for speculative profit. We are living in a total labor society and the way
in which we are commoditized

.

. .

is profoundly and disturbingly

253

normalized.
Unfortunately, these trends are the reverse of what technological
productivity was supposed to bring. Left to play out, the current model
will mean that a few individual "winners" who own siren servers will
live well aggregating the tiny, free contributions of the vast swath of
humanity, the totality of which is essential, but wherein each individual
person is almost valueless.254 Technology futurist Jaron Lanier
remarked that "People are gradually making themselves poorer than
better technology in
they need to be. We're setting up a situation where
255
unemployment.
more
means
the long termjust
However, the model we have chosen is not the only option. Lanier
believes that a fundamentally new way of valuing personal information,
creativity, and contribution will be imperative for a fair and functioning
information society of the future. 256 Lanier proposes instead that the
creative contributions of individuals be valued at reasonable prices
driven by marketplace demands.257 Each "access" of the creative
content by others would elicit a micro-payment, and thus "personal
expression would be valued., 258 The micropayment would offset the
259 Such a system
person's own consumption in the digital economy.
would require a different technical architecture than presently found on
the Internet, as it demands that information "remember" its origin so
that its creator can be compensated.26 ° Obviously, it is by no means easy
261
or quick to build, either from a policy or a technical standpoint. It
would likely require years of work, as well as societal assent to
government oversight of the underlying tracking and valuation
252. Id. ("Today, everyone's a hustler. But now we're not even just hustling for ourselves
or our bosses, but for so many other, unseen bosses ... [for example,] for Twitter, which just
converted years of tiny, aggregated work acts into $78 of fungible value per user.").
253. The Internet as Playground and Factory, DIGITAL LABOR CONFERENCE,
http://digitallabor.org/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2013).
254. LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE?, supra note 116, at 11.
255. Id. at 8.
256. See id. at 7-10.
257. See id.
258.
259.

LANIER, You ARE NOT A GADGET, supra note 107, at 100-01.
LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE?, supra note 116, at 240.

260. See id at 226-27.
261. See id. at 233-35.
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Critics will no doubt argue that this outcome is implausible for at
least two reasons. First, it is far-fetched to imbue a "virtual proxy" with
real personhood in any non-entertainment sense. This Article makes no
argument that this "proxy being" is a "real person" in any true sense,
but copyright law suggests some interesting parallels. Although a
263
person's persona (name, likeness, and attributes) is not copyrightable,
under copyright law authors get protection for sufficiently delineated
fictional characters. 264 It will be difficult for supporters to argue that big
data analytical models "predict behavior" without running an individual
in sufficient simulation to meet the tests for copyrightability. In an
interesting case from the Ninth Circuit illustrating both of these issues,
the actors who portrayed the characters Norm and Cliff were able to sue
Paramount studios for licensing animatronic robots to a national chain
of bars that closely resembled their real appearances. 26 Might the
"author" of one's virtual proxy have an intellectual property interest
in
it? The answer is unknown, but poses interesting questions.
In any case, supporters of predictive crime technology will have to
walk a fine line in resisting the increasing economic plausibility of data
as a property right. To both support the validity of predictive technology
and resist property rights theory will put them between the horns of a
dilemma. It will be difficult to argue that these systems have
methodological validity in predicting criminal behavior or buying
patterns, but have no commercial value to the primary human actor. A
valid predictive model creates, in essence, a virtual person running in
simulation. Are we to say that the human actor providing the attributes
on which this simulation depends has no economic rights to it?
The second criticism is that the government may simply demand free
access to the "proxy." Under a compensated data use system, however,
commercial actors must reconceive the economic profitability of datagathering models, and when they do so, large amounts of feeder data
that predictive policing systems can pull from may become more
expensive or even dry up altogether. Governments cannot force
commercial entities to track and store information without
compensation, even in our present environment. 266 In a future system
262.
263.

See id. at 344-45.
JULIE COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY
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264. See id. at 257-65; see, e.g., MGM, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 900 F. Supp. 1287
(C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that James Bond is a copyrightable character under either the Second
Circuit or the Ninth Circuit test).
265. Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811 (9th Cir. 1997).
266. Robert Lenzner, AT], Verizon, Sprint Are Paid Cash By NSA For Your Private
Communications, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlenzner/2013/09/
23
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(noting that the
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where personal data is costly and companies only record what they truly
need, governmental interests would have to pay companies even more
for data, demanding that these costs be exposed and rationalized within
the state and national budgeting processes.
Regardless of the likelihood that Lanier's proposal will be
implemented in the near future, it illustrates that technical visionaries
recognize the limits of free access to personal data, and are cognizant
that change will likely be necessary to accommodate different policy
priorities. These changes, in turn, support the policy behind a property
right for data. Over time, individuals possessing a property right to data
may ultimately demand a higher price for its use, depriving much of the
indiscriminate, inexpensive data gathering that occurs in today's today
surveillance-prediction paradigm of its favorable cost-benefit ratio.
VI. CONCLUSION
267
"Knowledge invents the Secret."--Michel Foucault

We now have the capacity to atomize human behaviors into gestures
and biometric signals, and to dissect each thought into its constituent
words, attributes, and hesitations as that thought forms. Our
technologists believe that, with enough of this kind of atomization,
higher-order selfhood can be modeled deterministically in advance. As
a result, humans are in danger of becoming not only transparent, but
also invisible and irrelevant.
Both [governments and corporations] want access to everything
that can be known about you, because who knows until later what
may prove the crucial piece of information to uncover a terrorist
network or lure in a new network of customers. They want
everything, at least, that can be run through a system of massive
computers and sorted into patterns of various potentially useful
kinds. You are to be, in this sense, the transparent man or
transparent woman. Your acts, your life patterns, your rights,
your codes are to be an open book to them -- and268increasingly a
....
closed book to you. You are to be their secret
In choosing to apply these principles to criminal prediction, our
NSA already compensates communications carriers for access to telephony metadata).
267.
268.

2013),
secret/.
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society demonstrates that law and other institutions are in danger of
"dehumanization"--in danger of forgetting that humans are even part of
the equation. In this increasingly machine-mediated world, this form of
justice, one choice among a wide spectrum of options, chooses us as
consequence of our approach to technology. 269 With that choice comes
consequences to our privacy and our capacity to create, and if
unchecked represents the poorest possible policy, a total surveillance,
mediated, and deterministic society that fails even to make its citizens
safe.
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